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Abstract 
The European Union is a unique blend of harmonised practice and mutual recognition of 
different regimes. In this paper, we conclude that arguments for continued diversity are more 
significant than the existing literature recognises. We build on the Varieties of Capitalism 
argument for trading on (rather than effacing) comparative institutional advantages, as well 
as Sabel and Zeitlin’s for the learning potential of ‘directly deliberative polyarchy’. We link 
these to the emphasis in non-EU focused literature on the lack of robustness implied by one-
size fits all. Diversification of gene pool, model or policy regime is essential insurance against 
unforeseen threats. We also focus on dangers of epistemic closure implied by analytical 
monocultures in conditions of uncertainty, and on epistemological justifications for 
disciplined eclecticism in regulation and analysis. The relevance to banking and fiscal union 
and other policy areas is briefly considered, as are the dangers posed by an emerging German 
Consensus. 
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Avoiding monocultures in the European 
Union: the case for the mutual recognition of 
difference in conditions of uncertainty 
 
1. Introduction 
The history of the European Union has been marked by a fiercely contested 
trade-off between two fundamental approaches: the search for the best 
common framework on which countries can converge and the search for the 
best modus vivendi between different regimes. The EU has evolved as a 
delicate balance between supra-nationalism and intergovernmentalism and 
between harmonisation of regulations or policies and the mutual recognition 
of different regimes. Many of the arguments for being on one-side of this 
trade-off or another are well rehearsed. The need to avoid negative 
externalities of individual country behaviour, resolve coordination problems, 
achieve economies of scale and reduce transaction costs points in the direction 
of supra-nationalism and harmonisation. By contrast, the need to respect the 
different goals, values, comparative institutional advantages and functional 
requirements of member states – as well as the superior democratic legitimacy 
of their polities – points in the direction of intergovernmentalism and the 
mutual recognition of difference.  
This paper examines whether the preferred balance between these two broad 
approaches to EU policy making should also be a function of two further 
factors that are much less often considered: first, we apply to the case of the 
EU general arguments advanced by Evans (2004) against ‘institutional 
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monocropping’ and Rodrik (2009) against ‘one size fits all’ policies, and show 
that diversification of policy response in conditions of uncertainty is often 
essential if the EU as a whole is to be robust in the face of shocks. In a 
nutshell, we argue that in a world of uncertainty we cannot know what the 
best model or best practice is or will be, and that this raises the insurance 
value of diversity of theoretical framework and practical regulation. For this 
reason alone, we argue that there is more merit in diversification of policy and 
market response to shocks across the Union, and in low correlations in 
behaviour, than the normal focus on the costs of poor policy coordination 
would suggest. 
Secondly, we build on the work of Sabel and Zeitlin (2010) and specifically 
their claim that at present many aspects of EU governance exhibit qualities of 
‘directly deliberative polyarchy’ – qualities that provide the Union with 
unrivalled potential for learning from diversity and for innovative policy 
adaptation in the face of strategic uncertainty. Such uncertainty is indeed 
ubiquitous – thanks in particular to policy innovations. But, while we agree 
with Sabel and Zeitlin (2010, p.9) that this makes the deliberative polyarchy 
enabled by a multipolar distribution of power attractive, we are less sanguine 
than they are about its continued persistence in many areas of EU and 
Eurozone policy making. For this reason, we examine the very real dangers of 
epistemic closure leading to myopia about emerging risks whenever we 
instead get harmonised practice and univocal deliberation and this hardens 
into an analytical monoculture.  
To this end, the paper applies the insights of Romantic and postmodern 
philosophy into the framing (and distorting) role of theory and language in 
order to construct a new argument for disciplined eclecticism (or deliberative 
polyarchy) in EU policy and analysis. We argue that the EU should not see its 
current patchwork of partial harmonisation, subsidiarity and mutual 
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recognition of difference as (at best) a politically necessary weakness but 
rather trumpet it as an epistemic source of strength. In particular, we argue 
that the Eurozone should not even be aiming for a full banking and fiscal 
union if this is taken to imply (which it need not) a full harmonisation of 
regulation, policy approach and analysis rather than a carefully coordinated 
modus vivendi between still different regimes. We also argue that the recent 
upsetting of the balance of power and influence in the EU and the emergence 
of a ‘German Consensus’1 backed by the strong conditionality of crisis bailout 
funds risks entrenching a univocal policy and regulatory response. As a 
result, we argue that the EU and Eurozone should strive to preserve 
multipolar decision-making, and to find third-way responses that can answer 
legitimate German concerns about free riding, reform fatigue and 
coordination problems while avoiding the epistemic and practical risks of a 
fully harmonised or monoculture approach. 
In its present form, this working paper consists principally of a high level 
abstract argument, whose general implications are considered in relation to 
three facets of the modern EU – the Single Market, Economic and Monetary 
Union, and the Open Method of Coordination.  We do also consider in outline 
the likely practical relevance of our thesis to two topical issues – fiscal union 
and banking union within the Eurozone. The paper should nevertheless be 
seen as work in progress. Much work remains to be done to consider its 
merits at the level of detailed EU policy generation and implementation. 
 
 
                                                        
1 'The term 'German Consensus' is used here by analogy with the 'Washington Consensus' 
associated with the World Bank and IMF in the 1990s. The intention is not to suggest a complete 
consensus on fiscal and regulatory matters within Germany any more than there was such a 
consensus within the World Bank and Washington establishment. Rather, the intention is to 
suggest an analogous imposition on weak recipient states of a hegemonic 'world view' backed by 
the use of strong conditionality'. 
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2. Theoretical frames 
2.1. The current state of debate on the balance of advantage between 
harmonisation and diversity 
There is no need to rehearse at any length the standard arguments for top-
down coordination (the Community Method) and harmonisation of policy 
and regulation across the shared trading, economic, social, and currency 
space of the EU or Eurozone. Supranational coordination and regulatory or 
policy harmonisation are usually seen as superior to intergovernmentalism 
and the mutual recognition or toleration of difference in at least six respects: 
(i) in solving basic coordination and collective action problems; (ii) in limiting 
the negative spill-overs of individual country initiatives; (iii) in preventing 
some countries free-riding on the stability or growth enhancing efforts of 
others; (iv) in avoiding a race to the bottom in regulations; (v) in lowering the 
transaction costs implicit in doing business in multiple regulatory regimes; 
and (vi) in boosting economies of scale across the Union. Useful reviews of 
this literature can be found in Levi-Faur (2011) and Dehouse (1997).  
Many of the contrary arguments in favour of safeguarding both national 
diversity in regulation and the primacy of nation states in collective decision-
making  (intergovernmentalism) are equally well-rehearsed: the need to 
respect different stages of development and different preferences among 
member states; and the greater democratic legitimacy and efficacy of 
nationally based decision-making and regulation (Nicoläidis and Shaffer, 
2005). Perhaps the most sophisticated economic argument for diversity comes 
from the Varieties-of-Capitalism thesis that different countries evolve 
specialisations in line with their own distinct comparative institutional 
advantages (Hall and Soskice, 2000). By extending Ricardo’s argument to 
cover institutions, the clear implication is that a trading bloc is stronger for 
Richard Bronk & Wade Jacoby 
9   
 
having members with different institutional strengths and different 
specialisations. Indeed, this thesis implies that there is no single efficient 
regulatory and institutional model on which all countries can converge 
without loss (Hodson and Simoni, 2009). It is central to the Varieties of 
Capitalism approach that there are different ways of being efficient given 
different institutional legacies and specialisations (just as surely as there are 
different equally rational value trade-offs between efficiency and equity). It is 
also central that a country’s institutional mix is often a delicate bundle of self-
reinforcing, mutually complementary and interdependent institutions (Hall & 
Soskice, 2000). This means that any attempt (e.g., at EU level) to harmonise 
around some new hybrid compromise or ‘common’ set of regulations may 
fatally weaken the existing strengths of each ex ante national model by 
introducing institutional inconsistency that may cause the respective model to 
unravel (Bronk, 2000). The institutional differences and corresponding 
specialisations on which each country’s competitiveness depends can all too 
easily be effaced by clumsy harmonisation and by attempts to cherry-pick the 
‘best’ features of all the various models. 
 
2.2. Diversity for robustness: avoiding the dangers of monocropping in 
conditions of uncertainty 
The argument in this paper, however, partly centres on a different problem: 
that even if all countries could agree on a ‘one-size fits all approach’ in any 
particular policy area, without any country suffering obvious immediate 
damage or institutional inconsistency or loss of competitiveness, they might 
still ‘end up converging on the wrong set of regulations’, the wrong solutions 
(Rodrik, 2009). Indeed, the discourse of best practice and of creating a level 
playing field is always in danger of leading to ‘institutional monocropping’ 
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that – exactly like a monoculture in agriculture where every farmer uses the 
apparently ‘best’ or most productive strain – is highly susceptible to 
unforeseen diseases (Evans, 2004; Haldane, 2009; Bronk, 2011a). This is an 
argument that centres on the limits of rational planning and law-making in 
conditions of uncertainty, and on the benefits – well articulated in investment 
theory – of diversification and low correlations in the face of unforeseen 
shocks. As Rodrik (2011, p.224) puts it in a discussion of global capital 
adequacy standards: ‘In the light of the great uncertainty about the merits of 
different regulatory approaches, it may be better to let a variety of regulatory 
models flourish side by side’. 
To understand the importance of this argument, it is necessary to examine, 
first, the prevalence of intractable or radical uncertainty especially in 
innovative regimes; and, secondly, why relying on any one regulatory model 
or conceptual framework may be fatal to our ability to make open-minded 
assessments of our evolving predicament. Only then can we understand why 
revision of what is considered best practice is unlikely to be sufficiently 
radical to inoculate policymakers against the dangers of analytical and 
regulatory monocultures. 
It is well understood in economics (since Knight, 1921) that there is a 
fundamental difference between measurable risks that can be assigned 
probabilities (or otherwise controlled for) and immeasurable uncertainty. Less 
well acknowledged is how prevalent the latter type of uncertainty is, and how 
unavoidable in complex and innovative regimes. Uncertainty comes in two 
main forms. The first is ‘epistemological uncertainty’, where firm prediction 
or definitive analysis is precluded by the multi-faceted nature of our 
predicament, the presence of increasing returns and non-linear reactions to 
small events, and by the sheer volume of relevant information (Bronk, 2011b). 
Even more intractable is the ‘ontological uncertainty’ or indeterminacy 
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implied by innovation and the freedom to choose between newly imagined 
and constantly surprising options. Furthermore, first-order uncertainty 
caused by constant innovation and the imagining of new possibilities is 
normally ‘compounded by uncertainty about the second-order creative 
reactions of others’ (Bronk, 2011a). 
Where it is present, the implications of uncertainty for policy-makers are very 
significant: it implies that we can never know what best practice is, especially 
as it relates to the future yet to be created by constant innovation. As a result, 
uncertainty further implies that, all things being equal, it is better to have a 
diversified set of practices or regulations in play, since they will not all suffer 
from the same errors at once. Of course, there are strict limits to the extent to 
which any one polity can keep its regulatory options open without suffering 
from hopeless confusion and inconsistency; but at the level of a Union of 
polities like the EU, the argument from uncertainty suggests the possible 
benefits of having different constituent polities operating under different 
regulatory regimes side by side. That is, the common good of the Union as a 
whole may be better protected by diversification at a national level amongst 
what are ex ante (given uncertainty) equally error-prone regulatory models, 
and by efforts to establish a modus vivendi between such models, rather than 
by efforts to harmonise to one apparently ‘best’ standard.  
This epistemic argument for the value of diversity in the face of uncertainty is 
distinct from the democratic legitimacy and institutional reasons also 
discussed by Rodrik (2009) and Evans (2004). In other words, it is distinct 
from (if complementary to) the argument that pluralism allows for greater 
sensitivity to national preferences, while homogeneity of practice enforced by 
supranational actors risks causing political and institutional infantilism at 
national or regional level.  
Avoiding monocultures in the European Union 
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Our version of the monocropping argument is also distinct from the Varieties 
of Capitalism thesis that there is a necessary plurality of ways of being 
efficient given different path-dependent institutional and specialisation 
configurations. We argue that taking uncertainty seriously casts doubt on the 
importance of any static definition of economic efficiency. In conditions of 
ontological uncertainty, where the Union will inevitably face unexpected 
common shocks, it may be beneficial for the long run democratic and 
economic stability of the Union as a whole to have the insurance policy of 
some member countries operating at any particular moment inside the short-
term efficient frontier, if they are doing so as a result of an institutional 
configuration with very different properties to those of other member states.  
Of course, it is possible to overstate the prevalence of uncertainty in some 
fields and to ignore the possibility of learning from experience which 
regulatory regime stands up best to unexpected shocks. But especially in 
those areas where innovation (not least in regulatory and policy regimes 
themselves) constantly changes the parameters of life, uncertainty should not 
be underestimated. For example, little that even five years ago passed for 
received wisdom in the area of monetary or fiscal policy or banking 
regulation in the EU has stood the test of time given the enormity of the 
unfolding regime change implied by the novel experiment of Economic and 
Monetary Union. Moreover, we should not underestimate how far our ability 
to spot problems as they emerge, and then revise the regulatory frameworks 
we use, is compromised by the tendency for our analysis to be framed by the 
cognitive internalisation of those same frameworks. This brings us to the 
problem of epistemic closure if harmonised practice hardens, as we suggest it 
often does, into an analytical monoculture. 
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2.3. From monocropping to monoculture: analytical frames and the 
epistemological argument for diversity 
The ‘monocropping’ analogy used by Evans (2004, p.34) brings out the 
important argument for the greater robustness and adaptive value of diverse 
ecologies in the face of change. In this paper, though, we switch from using 
this monocropping analogy to its close cousin, the ‘monoculture’ analogy. We 
do so, in part, because the latter has epistemic and cultural framing 
connotations missing from the former. Our contention is that the tendency for 
any single or homogenous policy approach to constrain the way we think 
about issues, construct data and analyse problems is every bit as important as 
its direct constraint on action.  
Here a reminder of some basic Romantic (post-Kantian) or postmodern 
epistemological arguments is in order.2  In particular, naïve empiricism that 
sees data and facts as simply ‘out there’, able objectively to inform, constrain 
and constantly update our choice of theoretical frameworks, fails to take 
account of the extent to which our analysis and beliefs – indeed the data 
themselves – are necessarily partial products of the conceptual and theoretical 
structures that our minds supply (Bronk, 2009; Bronk, 2011b). We cannot 
make sense of the chaos around us without the light shone by theory, model 
or conceptual structure; but since any one theory, model or conceptual 
framework has its weaknesses as well as strengths, it necessarily distorts as 
well as focuses our vision (Bronk, 2011a). This means that if we rely at any 
one time exclusively on one (apparently ‘best’) theoretical or conceptual 
framework, we are liable (at least initially) to miss aspects of reality outside 
the area illuminated by that framework – only registering them (if at all) 
when they have already unexpectedly tripped us up (Bronk, 2010). The 
                                                        
2 This paper builds on a philosophical tradition that is described in some detail in chapters five 
and ten of Bronk (2009) 
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epistemic and practical costs of such theoretical dogmatism or conceptual 
monoculture are likely to be highest when the reality we are dealing with is 
not merely multi-faceted but also constantly changing as a result of product 
and policy innovation. 
This then is why regulatory and policy monocultures in the EU or elsewhere 
are potentially so dangerous: they tend to be informed by, or to harden into, a 
monoculture in the theoretical and conceptual framework with which we 
interpret the world. Such an analytical monoculture makes us less prone to 
spot anomalies that challenge us to revise our conceptual or regulatory 
framework before it is too late. Moreover, the theoretical and conceptual 
frameworks we use structure our behaviour as well as our analysis and help 
construct social reality in their own image (Bronk, 2009). As a result, a 
theoretical (as well as regulatory) monoculture may lead to frighteningly high 
correlations in our responses to unexpected common shocks, increasing the 
risk of social and economic destabilisation if the theoretical framework is 
misleading in some significant way. 
Fortunately, the dangers of conceptual and regulatory monocultures can be 
greatly reduced by modelling pluralism, disciplined eclecticism and constant 
experimentation with new conceptual frameworks and perspectives (Bronk, 
2009, p.282f; Bronk, 2011a, p.16f). And here the EU has an enormous potential 
inbuilt advantage: as an epistemic and policymaking community, it comprises 
a huge plurality of different conceptual frameworks and regulatory models. 
Nicolaidis (2012, p.252) reminds us that the EU is ‘not constituted by separate 
demoi nor demoi-made-into-one but by distinct demoi progressively opening 
to each other and to each other’s democratic systems’ – a ‘third way’ that 
involves ‘sharing, pooling, enmeshing, but not unifying’. Moreover, at the 
institutional and regulatory level, Sabel and Zeitlin (2010) argue that – 
through mechanisms such as ‘councils of regulators’, the open method of 
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coordination and the tendency to devolve implementation down to local level 
– the EU has stumbled upon a novel form of experimental governance, which 
they dub ‘directly deliberative polyarchy’ (See also Cohen and Sabel, 1997). In 
their view, ‘deliberative polyarchy is a machine for learning from diversity’, 
and one that transforms an apparent ‘obstacle to closer integration into an 
asset for achieving it’ (Sabel and Zeitlin 2010, p.6). To the extent that this is 
true, it should render the EU almost uniquely well suited to the task of 
remaining open-minded and innovative in how it analyses and interprets the 
challenges it faces in an uncertain and constantly changing world. But we 
argue that it can only be true to the extent that the EU continues to balance its 
tendency to harmonise with a mutual recognition and toleration of difference, 
and to the extent it continues to balance the Community Method with an 
inclusive involvement of nation states and sub-national actors in its 
deliberations and decision-making. As Sabel and Zeitlin acknowledge, 
deliberative polyarchy also rests in an EU context on the persistence of a 
multipolar distribution of power across the Union.  
In our brief review in section 3 of several areas of recent EU policy making, 
and in particular aspects of policy reaction to the Eurozone crisis, we explore 
two complementary dangers that threaten to undermine the rosy picture 
painted by Sabel and Zeitlin. First, there is a danger that, as the networked 
and polyarchic agencies that currently exist within the EU succeed in 
establishing best practice and fine-tuning a more harmonised approach for 
the future, the cognitive diversity that has up to now been their greatest 
source of strength in coming up with innovative solutions and spotting new 
problems may become a wasting asset. Our disquieting suggestion is that the 
EU has benefited from a long phase transition during which it enjoyed the 
undoubted benefits of greater harmonisation and coordination together with 
the cognitive benefits that were the legacy of past diversity. In the brave new 
Avoiding monocultures in the European Union 
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world of policy best practice, level playing fields in regulation, and (within 
the Eurozone) banking and fiscal union, there may be insufficient 
mechanisms for ensuring the continued replenishment of cognitive diversity – 
the wellspring of policy experimentation and nuance.  
Secondly, the combined effect of German reunification, Germany’s relative 
economic outperformance within the Eurozone, Germany’s imposition (as the 
principal creditor) of strict conditionality for bailout funds, and the United 
Kingdom’s progressive disengagement from EU deliberations, has served to 
entrench German financial and intellectual dominance within the EU. This 
brings with it the danger that cognitive as well as policy diversity at EU level 
may be damaged by an increasing power imbalance and by the progressive 
emergence or imposition of a German Consensus.3 As we argue below, this 
threatens not only the capacity of the EU as a whole to adapt to unexpected 
shocks but also represents an unacknowledged potential source of huge 
burdens for Germany as de facto the chief financial shock absorber of the 
Eurozone. We argue that cognitive and policy diversity remains an insurance 
premium worth paying even for the German paymasters themselves. 
 
3. Safeguarding diversity in EU practice and analysis  
This section applies our basic intuitions about regulatory monocultures 
discussed above to important areas of EU policymaking. It also follows these 
areas into the on-going economic and financial crisis in the EU, which has 
generated important impulses towards further policy harmonization The 
areas we investigate are the Single Market, European Monetary Union and 
                                                        
3 Beck (2012) argues similarly that we are seeing the emergence of a ‘German Europe’. He also 
argues (p.28) that ‘compulsion to act speedily’ in the face of crises short-circuits the normal 
process of democratic and pluralistic deliberation. 
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resulting moves towards fiscal and banking union, and the Open Method of 
Coordination.  
 
3.1. Mutual recognition of difference in the Single Market 
The Single Market in goods, labour and, to a lesser extent, services has been 
the most significant EU achievement of the last thirty years. Initially, it 
spurred an enormous effort to replace a multitude of national regulations 
with common harmonised standards that would reduce transaction costs for 
cross-border trade and remove the scope for tacit protectionism. But the 
Commission’s ‘1992’ internal market initiatives quickly moved in many areas 
from the attempt to harmonise regulations to securing mutual recognition of 
different standards (Nicoläidis, 1997). An early example of this in the area of 
free movement of labour was the 1984 decision to introduce the ‘principle of a 
general system of mutual recognition for all higher education qualifications’ 
(Owen & Dynes, 1989). Another, in the area of financial services, was the 
decision to allow banks to open branches and operate in member states other 
than the one in which they are regulated on the basis of a ‘passport’ 
authorisation provided by their home regulator (Tilford & Whyte, 2010).  
In legal terms, mutual recognition means that if a product or service can be 
sold in one jurisdiction, it can be sold lawfully in any other participating 
jurisdiction without being subject to additional checks, tests, and regulations 
(Nicolaidis and Shaffer, 2005). More specifically, mutual recognition involves 
a contractual norm among governments (or standard-setting bodies to whom 
governance has been delegated) to transfer regulatory authority from the state 
where a transaction occurs (host country) to the home country of an 
individual product, person, service or firm (Nicolaidis, 1997). In this sense, 
mutual recognition is more than an instrument to protect national diversity. It 
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can also be thought of as an instrument of extraterritoriality in that it allows 
states not only to keep their regulatory standards but also to project them into 
the legal systems of other contracting partners. In practice, mutual recognition 
is generally conditional or ‘managed.’ One implication is that mutual 
recognition itself constitutes a ‘third way’ between national and regional (or 
global) regulations insofar as it accepts ‘foreign regulatory determinations 
implicit in the import of goods and services’ (Nicolaidis and Shaffer, 2005) or 
‘consensual extraterritoriality’. 
Does mutual recognition then succeed in providing the EU with the benefits 
of greater cross-border trade while also affording it prudential protection 
against the perils of institutional monocropping and analytical monocultures? 
In principle, the answer is ‘yes’. First, such regimes obviously do allow 
different standards to co-exist, and avoid the wholesale harmonisation of 
institutional and regulatory frameworks. As we have seen, such diversity 
helps each country protect its specific comparative institutional advantages 
(thereby boosting the economic vibrancy of the bloc as a whole). It also helps 
the EU avoid putting all its regulatory and associated analytical eggs in one 
basket, reducing the chances of highly correlated economic failures or shared 
spells of cognitive myopia associated with analytical monocultures. Secondly, 
mutual recognition regimes are (or can be) sensitive to unexpected shifts in 
the political environment. For example, many mutual recognition regimes 
were unwound after the 9/11 attacks, including ones for container shipping 
inspections and airline passenger data (Nicoläidis and Shaffer, 2005). Finally, 
mutual recognition regimes often explicitly include braking mechanisms, 
such as exceptions for national security, financial stability, and social peace. 
While such instruments can be abused, they also provide, at least in principle, 
scope to prevent unwarranted or premature closure on one regulatory system.  
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Looking back over thirty years of Single Market policy practice, however, the 
position is more complex than this argument from principle suggests. While 
many of the theoretical benefits of mutual recognition have materialised, and 
it has often proven quicker and easier to negotiate such a regime than a full 
harmonisation directive, disadvantages (real or imagined) have also become 
apparent. In particular, there has been considerable anxiety in some countries 
that mutual recognition would lead to a race to the bottom in regulations if 
countries gained advantage from more lax regulation. This fear proved 
largely fatal to the Bolkestein directive on general services in 2004, which had 
sought to allow firms to operate throughout the Union on the basis of the 
regulations in their country of origin (Tilford &Whyte, 2010). In the area of 
banking, too, ‘passporting’ suffered a reputational hit when Iceland’s banks 
ran into difficulties in 2008 and Irish banks reached a size that threatened the 
solvency of that country (Tilford &Whyte, 2010). Not surprisingly, such 
problems have again boosted the willingness of member states to consider 
harmonising financial regulatory standards under a single European Banking 
Authority; and they have distracted attention from some of the good effects of 
diversity of regulation. Spain’s lone use of some countercyclical capital 
requirements even before the crisis may stand out as a rarely acknowledged 
benefit of allowing countries to experiment with and pursue initially 
unfashionable regulatory paths.  
It is clear then that the consensual extraterritoriality associated with mutual 
recognition sometimes goes too far to allow countries to be confident that 
they can protect vital areas of national difference in norms, interests and 
institutional advantage. It is equally clear, though, that mutual recognition 
sometimes threatens to externalise risks associated with individual regimes 
through contagion effects. When this happens, there are frequently calls for a 
return to a policy of full regulatory harmonisation and unified policy practice 
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– a move that would often, we have argued, imply very real economic, social 
and democratic legitimacy risks. For this reason, the EU has developed in 
many areas of single market policy a host of third-way alternatives to a rigid 
dichotomy between total harmonisation and mutual recognition of difference. 
These include (i) ‘comply or explain’ clauses in harmonisation directives; (ii) 
common standards coexisting and competing with home country regulation 
(e.g., the European Company Statute); (iii) common testing and safety 
modules agreed at practical level for use within still divergent national 
regulatory regimes; and (iv), finally, a pragmatic mix in any particular area of 
harmonised regulation for core issues and mutual recognition of difference 
for less salient aspects of regulation. Such a pragmatic approach often allows 
the EU in practice to find a compromise that ensures harmonisation where the 
potential gains are greatest and considerable residual variation in national 
practice within this broadly harmonized framework. Such a balancing act is 
key to achieving economies of scale at EU level while protecting cognitive 
diversity and preserving policy and economic diversification in the face of 
uncertainty. 
 
3.2. Economic and Monetary Union and the dangers of a ‘German 
Consensus’ 
EMU may at first sight seem to be a paradoxical case of harmonisation (in this 
case of monetary policy) leading not to dangerously high correlations in 
economic performance (as mooted above) but rather to damaging divergence 
and dislocation. This is because the shocks felt in the Eurozone over the last 
decade have been the asymmetric impacts of the regime change represented 
by the launch of EMU itself. Given immensely different starting points in 
background inflation, institutional and industrial capacity and the political 
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will to reform, the apparently common shock of EMU became a source of 
asymmetric competitiveness and real interest rate shocks. In this 
environment, the loss of nominal exchange rate shock absorbers has caused 
dislocation and divergence. This underscores that policy innovations and a 
piecemeal harmonisation of policy may have unintended consequences; and it 
also suggests that harmonisation only increases the correlations of response to 
common shocks when all the relevant parameters are harmonised or shared 
in common.  
The current crisis in the Eurozone now looks set to increase the pressure for 
harmonisation of policy among member states across the board – and 
particularly in the areas of fiscal policy and banking regulation. The initial 
rationale for EMU (lowering transaction costs and furthering economic and 
political integration) remains in place, but is now dwarfed by fear of the costs 
of a Eurozone breakup. In this environment, and when creditor countries are 
exercised by the negative externalities and contagion effects of fiscal and 
banking failures in weaker member states, there is a clear impetus for more 
centralised control of fiscal policy and a ‘banking union’ with harmonised 
standards and rules. Equally, it is politically unacceptable for some large 
European banks to be ‘international in life but national in death.’ As the 
argument in section 2 above suggests, however, great care needs to be taken 
not to harmonise fiscal policy and banking regulations more than is strictly 
necessary to limit contagion, free-riding and unwarranted concentration of 
fiscal risk. In particular, Germany and other creditor nations need to take care 
not to focus exclusively on the externality costs of failure of an individual 
country to reform in line with dominant thinking. If dominant thinking (at 
present in favour of fiscal austerity) were to be at fault, harmonisation of 
approach across the Eurozone would imply larger rather than smaller risks of 
generalised default for creditors and debtors alike.  
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The essence of the current ‘German Consensus’ imposed by bail-out 
conditionality is a combination of supply-side reform and fiscal austerity. To 
be clear, this is not an anti-statist paradigm since the state is envisaged as 
having a key role in promoting competition (Silvia, 2010; Dullien and Guerot, 
2012). In principle, the German paradigm also remains open to a substantial 
social state to help citizens cope with high adjustment costs. In practice, 
though, the German focus on limiting fiscal deficits in crisis-hit Eurozone 
members has mitigated against social measures in the recent context. As with 
the Washington Consensus before it, the German Consensus has many 
detractors. Merkel’s policies have been roundly criticized by officials in 
Southern Europe and by many academics; but Germany’s relative economic 
power and pivotal role in funding bailout mechanisms has given its current 
government’s vision a disproportionate role in fashioning associated 
conditionality mechanisms. Within Germany, some opposition parties have 
misgivings about the policies of harmonized fiscal retrenchment across the 
Eurozone, but the domestic popularity of this policy mix – what the Germans 
often refer to as a ‘stability culture’ – means little open displeasure is voiced 
by the opposition. In this way, a virtual economic monoculture in the 
Eurozone has been born, with likely long-term consequences in terms of high 
correlations in weak economic performance and a reduction in cognitive 
diversity and analytical openness.  
 
3.2.1.  The perils of a misconceived fiscal union  
A major element of German policymaking throughout the crisis has been the 
push for renewed efforts for enforceable fiscal limits in individual states. 
These fiscal harmonization efforts have resulted in a kind of ‘Groundhog Day 
effect’ in which many of the now-30 EU crisis summits seems to produce a 
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new variant of the same basic idea. These steps include the Fiscal Compact, 
the Six-Pack, the Two-Pack, and various other measures (Mabbett and 
Schelkle, 2013). In essence, all these measures seek to spread the idea of ‘debt 
brakes’ constitutionalized in Germany at both federal and state (Land) levels 
by a 2009 reform. 
How wise is this stampede towards national fiscal uniformity across the EU? 
Belke and Gros (2009) have argued convincingly that, since fiscal policy and 
reform is often a source of unanticipated shocks (given uncertainty about the 
impact of any particular measure), there are considerable diversification 
benefits in allowing countries to pursue independent national fiscal policies 
rather than a common fiscal policy. As they put it, ‘the variance of a sum of 
shocks is lower the lower the covariance among the individual components’ 
(p.46). This argument rests on the frequent self-evident failure of 
policymakers and economists to predict the impact of their fiscal 
interventions in uncertain and highly dynamic situations.  
The argument does, of course, need to be set against the manifest problems of 
fiscal externalities and of some countries free-riding on the fiscal prudence (or 
reflation) of their neighbours. Furthermore, many would argue against Belke 
and Gros that the point of the fiscal coordination championed by Germany is 
not to enforce homogeneity of behaviour, but to incentivise behaviour 
appropriate to the particular circumstances that each country finds itself, with 
sanctions against time-inconsistent or free-riding behaviour. But the Belke 
and Gros thesis could be extended to cover even this sort of nuanced 
approach if it is assumed that the coordination is based on a shared 
monoculture theoretical perspective on how fiscal policy works. For example, 
it is not self-evident that the dominant German view of the value of fiscal 
austerity is without blind spots as to the merits of demand management in 
times of crisis. If everyone had internalised this German view in 2008 
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(perhaps as a result of being initially forced institutionally to follow its 
dictates), there might have been fewer champions of coordinated fiscal easing 
in the first months of the post-Lehman crisis and perhaps even some 
catastrophic fiscal tightening at the height of the crisis. Fiscal dogma or theory 
can be a source of cognitive myopia, an epistemic source of shocks in its own 
right. A theoretical monoculture across the EU may increase rather than 
decrease the risk of highly correlated negative shocks.  
Looking forward there are many who might point to the German Consensus 
that is currently being imposed across the EU by the conditionality attached 
to bailout mechanisms but also more broadly by the Fiscal Compact — which 
all EU members except the UK and the Czech Republic have signed — and 
see exactly the risks elaborated above with a monoculture approach. With 
German policy makers constitutionalizing austerity at home, they appear 
blind to the fallacy of composition and to the danger that the externalities of 
fiscal austerity may be as damaging as the externalities of other countries’ 
high debt levels.  
In addition to the Belke and Gros argument that preserving national diversity 
in fiscal management can have a systemically prudential justification, one 
might add that the EU’s own fiscal impacts could and should be made less 
uniform and more responsive to national conditions. Indeed, as wide 
divergences among states become more apparent — as seen in large current 
account imbalances and divergent wage trends — EU instruments might be 
redesigned away from one-size-fits-all frameworks. Paradoxically, more 
centralized policies can be made attentive to difference. Proposals here 
include EU-wide unemployment insurance that takes account of very 
different growth rates across the EU (Pisani-Ferry et al., 1993; Dullien, 2008) 
or moves to peg infrastructure spending through the Structural Funds much 
more carefully to underlying conditions (Dullien and Schwarzer, 2009).  
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If respect for diversity need not discredit centralized policy, neither can 
formally decentralized policy guarantee respect for epistemic diversity. In 
principle, Merkel’s emerging preference for binding agreements between 
member states and the EU could accommodate substantial diversity in fiscal 
policy approach simply because they will be bilateral. In substance, however, 
the agreements seem likely to be highly uniform in their focus and their 
targets, essentially entrenching a variant of the German Consensus in each 
member state irrespective of whether they are export economies that can reap 
the full benefit of wage restraint inside the Single Market.  
 
3.2.2. The need to preserve diversity within a banking union 
When it comes to a banking union, the pressures in favour of harmonisation 
are clear. A monetary union without an integrated banking system is 
fundamentally flawed; and there are clear fiscal externalities and contagion 
effects when the banking system of one Eurozone member comes under 
pressure. Creditor member states in particular have an interest in ensuring 
that banking regulation and capital adequacy rules are robust in debtor 
countries. In this context, it is little surprise that we have seen pressure not 
only for a single regulator, but also a single rulebook, common deposit 
regulation and a common resolution mechanism. 
And yet, as the Varieties of Capitalism thesis makes clear, the idiosyncrasies 
of national banking systems (e.g., Hausbanken and Sparkassen in Germany) are 
often central to the comparative institutional advantage of each country, 
militating against enforced harmonisation of key aspects of financial 
structure. Moreover, the harmonised banking standards at the global Basel II 
committee level proved to be deficient in the financial crisis since 2007 – 
championing risk models that in retrospect confused uncertainty with 
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measurable risk, while encouraging a fatal confluence of perspective among 
regulators and regulated (Bronk, 2011a, p.15; Power, 2007, p.74). This 
underscores that regulators can never expect to be able to design a regulatory 
system able to cope perfectly with the unknown crises of tomorrow, and that 
they must remain open-minded about different modelling approaches.  
Given this, there may be strong diversification benefits for the EU as a whole 
(and Eurozone creditors in particular) in allowing considerable national 
diversity in banking regulation, under the aegis of loose coordination by the 
European Banking Authority and ECB. Despite this, there is ample evidence 
that the EU has in recent years consistently aimed to reduce the diversity of 
national banking regulation, even if the speed and the scope with which it has 
been able to do so has been constrained. In particular, the Committee on 
European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) – a network of national authorities – 
gave way in 2011 to the European Banking Authority (EBA). While the EBA 
remains a network of national authorities and has no direct supervisory 
power, it has a more hierarchical structure than the CEBS. For example, the 
EBA is clearly prioritizing technical convergence and a single European 
rulebook4 for banking. When its proposed technical standards are endorsed 
by the Commission, they have the same legal status as directives and 
regulations and do not require transposition into national law (Penders, 2013, 
p.30). The EBA also has the power to monitor member state compliance with 
these rules, although initial evidence is that the EBA has been quite 
deferential to national regulators (Giegold, 2013). In addition to binding 
regulations, the EBA can issue guidelines to banks with a ‘comply or explain’ 
obligation (Busuioc, 2013). Peer review panels are also deployed as 
mechanisms for testing and promoting further convergence. The EBA even 
did its own 2011 round of stress tests on 90 banks. These tests were widely 
                                                        
4 Not to be confused with the Single Supervisory Handbook being developed by the ECB in close 
coordination with the EBA. 
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seen as a failure. Nevertheless, in principle, the EBA remains able to trump 
national authorities in three contexts: emergency situations, binding 
mediation, or the breach of EU law (De Haan et al, 2012, p.386; Penders, 2013, 
p.41). 
The recently proposed Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) would, of 
course, go well beyond the EBA in its aspirations for a unified banking union. 
The SSM currently consists of a Council proposal scheduled for likely 
approval by the Commission and Parliament sometime after the German 
elections in September 2013. The intention is that the European Central Bank 
(ECB) will perform asset quality reviews of systemically important banks and 
then take over supervisory responsibility of these banks in September 2014. 
While the EBA will retain a role in standard setting and regulation, 
supervisory authority will be vested in the ECB, though in conjunction with 
national supervisors. The ECB was chosen, in part, because TFEU Article 127 
already envisioned the possibility of a supervisory role for the Bank and thus 
obviated the need for a difficult treaty change (Constancio, 2013). The ECB’s 
Board of Supervisors will be composed primarily of national supervisors, 
including officials from national central banks. Article 1 of the Council draft 
says, ‘When fulfilling its tasks according to this regulation the ECB shall 
respect the different types and sizes of credit institutions.’ Yet while much 
give and take might be expected — especially early on when prevailing 
national regulatory differences might be greatest — it is crucially envisaged 
that national authorities will have no formal authority to resist ECB decisions 
(even though they would generally have to implement them). In principle, 
national authorities would remain in charge of those (some 6000) banks that 
have liabilities under Euro 30 billion, represent less than 20% of a nation’s 
financial sector, or are not among a nation’s three largest banks. This would 
seem to give some real scope for preserving national difference. However, 
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under its formal mandate, the ECB would have the power to regulate any 
bank it chooses.  
Stepping back, if the EU is increasingly going to put all of its banking 
regulation and supervision eggs in one basket, it is worth asking whether it 
can really hope to create a 'safe basket' for the future, given uncertainty. As 
we argue above, diversity acts as a safety valve, helping to ensure that small 
problems do not become large ones by having highly correlated effects. 
Several scholars question in any case the EU’s ability to create a single 
working regulatory body. For some, the new policies that have arisen in the 
wake of financial turmoil are solutions to past problems (Moloney, 2012, 
p.16). Although learning from past mistakes is a good starting point, there 
remain serious doubts as to the EMU member states’ ability to create good 
regulatory policy moving forward.  Others note that, since these regulators 
have already failed once, it is unclear why we should trust them now to create 
a competent system (Black, 2010, pp.13, 16). If regulators harmonize and fail 
again in appropriate risk assessment (and no system of regulation can be 
perfect), this increases the chance for negative feedback loops, augmenting 
the very problem it was meant to fix (Black, 2010, p.14). Moreover, such 
harmonization carries the risk over time that the relevant regulators will come 
to share the same cognitive myopia and have fewer resources for diversity of 
perspective, learning and innovation. Finally, since there was in fact no 
common institutional design for those economies that weathered the recent 
storm (each one relying on a different institutional design), there is no clear 
evidence – even ex ante – of a single superior system (Moloney, 2012, p.7) 
The financial market, during the time of the crisis, suffered from destructive 
herd behaviour and homogenization (Moloney, 2012, p.15). This allowed a 
problem in one corner of the market to spread through the entire market 
(Haldane, 2009).  Harmonization of policy creates endogenous risks, and a 
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unified system spreads problems more quickly when compared to a 
diversified one (Black, 2010, p.46). In addition to systematic, widespread 
failures, an SSM suffers from asymmetric information. Although a single 
governing regulator has a good aerial view of the market, it lacks the ‘on the 
ground’ details faced by individual market players (Black, 2010, p. 37).  
 
3.3. The Open Method of Coordination 
For any champion of the benefits of multiple perspectives, toleration of 
diversity and epistemic humility in the face of strategic uncertainty, the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC) seems to be the most welcome recent 
innovation in EU policy practice and one that remains fairly widespread 
outside trade and Eurozone governance mechanisms. Early versions 
associated with the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and the European 
Employment Strategy were extended and formalised in the Lisbon Agenda 
launched in 2000 (Zeitlin, 2005). The OMC process operates to some extent 
under the shadow of monoculture thinking with its aim of fixing common 
guidelines and goals for the Union and establishing benchmarks of ‘best 
practice’. In its most recent forms, however, the typology of best practice is 
replaced by that of ‘mutual learning’ and identifying ‘good practices’ (e.g., 
CREST 4th OMC WG final report, 2009). Furthermore, the official OMC rubric 
makes explicit the paramount importance of translating common broad 
guidelines and goals into nationally specific plans that take account of 
‘national and regional differences’, and also the importance of allowing for 
‘periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review, organised as ‘mutual 
learning processes’ (European Council, 2000, quoted in Zeitlin, 2005). The 
OMC working groups include experts and representatives from a wide range 
of countries and backgrounds, and the breadth of stakeholder involvement is 
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an important guarantor of the plurality of perspectives and theoretical frames 
available to those involved.  
As Hodson and Simoni (2009, p.120) point out, ‘the Lisbon Agenda’s rejection 
of the one-size-fits-all’ and its essentially ‘intergovernmental approach to 
economic reform should resonate rather than rankle’ with the Varieties of 
Capitalism approach. Moreover, the Commission’s 2008 Joint Report on Social 
Protection and Social Inclusion quoted in Hassel (2009, p.133) makes clear 
how far this emphasis on plural solutions to diverse types of problem has 
permeated the discourse of the EU: ‘Everything considered, there is no single 
combination of policies and institutions to achieve and maintain good socio-
economic results, but rather there are different pathways to good 
performance that are, to a large extent, the result of distinct historical 
trajectories. Respecting the principles of subsidiarity (and the Open Method of 
Coordination), this allows scope for tailor-made policy packages to suit 
national preferences with respect to distributional aspects, risk-taking and 
other national objectives’.  
As we have seen, Sabel and Zeitlin (2010, p.4f) argue that OMC is a major 
example of a new and promising type of experimentalist governance, which 
they call ‘directly deliberative polyarchy’. In their somewhat idealised version 
of OMC, they see the EU as having forged a decision-making process that 
combines the benefits of coordination and peer pressure with those of local 
experimentation and deliberative pluralism. The system, they argue, has the 
enormous advantage in conditions of ‘strategic uncertainty’ of allowing for 
mutual learning, multipolar input to deliberations, constant peer review and 
deliberative revision of shared goals and metrics. In this way, OMC can be 
said to rescue large parts of the EU’s governance from the perils of analytical 
monocultures. 
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Needless to say, some scepticism is in order. For one thing, there is a tension 
at the heart of the OMC process between the notion of benchmarking ‘best’ 
(or at least ‘good’) practice and setting common guidelines, on the one hand, 
and the commitment to policy pluralism and local difference, on the other – a 
tension which is not entirely resolved by a faith in constant revision of targets 
and goals. A good example of this is the Lisbon Agenda’s target that all 
member states should invest 3% of GDP in R&D as a central plank in the EU’s 
efforts to become a more innovative and competitive economy. As Tilford and 
Whyte (2010) argue convincingly, it makes little sense for advanced and 
heavily industrialised countries such as Sweden to have the same R&D target 
as catch-up and developing countries (such as Bulgaria) or as predominantly 
service sector economies (such as the UK). Moreover, R&D is only a small 
part of the investment (much of it intangible) required to foster innovation 
especially in the service sector, so that a focus solely on R&D could be 
profoundly misleading (Tilford and Whyte, 2010). Any benchmarking 
exercise can begin to imply a normative bias towards conformity to common 
standards irrespective of local difference, especially if it is oversimplified and 
overhyped. 
A second potential weakness of the OMC approach is suggested by some 
wording in the CREST 4th OMC Working Group final report (2009, p.9). 
Arguing that its ‘mutual learning exercise’ and its mapping of good practices 
could help develop useful benchmarks, the report argues: ‘The benchmarking 
exercise could also deliver knowledge for a European open inventory of 
existing and tested policy instruments to improve the research excellence in 
universities, showing the relations between the instruments and the objectives 
of research excellence’. However laudable such a mutual learning exercise 
may be, there are dangers – as the Varieties of Capitalism thesis underscores – 
in the implicit suggestion that members can learn good practice from each 
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other and cherry-pick the best items from an ‘open inventory’. University 
research is integral to the different national models of capitalism, and this 
implies limits to the scope for learning and policy transfer across borders. As 
Hodson and Simoni (2009, p.121) put it: ‘Under different sets of institutional 
complementarities, economic reform must be “incentive compatible” in the 
sense of being consistent with the functioning of the underlying economy’. 
This argument, of course, in no way implies that countries cannot learn from 
each other. It merely underscores the need for intelligent and decentralised 
learning, with open access to the very different perspectives and experiences 
of other countries combined with a firm grasp of local particularities. 
The final criticism levelled at the OMC and the Lisbon Agenda is that they 
may have achieved little. Begg (2008, p.434), for example, argues that 
although ‘reform efforts have become more extensive and central to economic 
governance in all Member States, it is far from obvious that the reforms that 
have taken place have occurred because of the Lisbon strategy’. This might not 
trouble Sabel and Zeitlin for whom Lisbon and OMC is primarily about 
mutual learning rather than directly incentivising reform. But here, too, Begg 
(2008, p.433) has a point: to be justified, the expense and trouble of organising 
OMC and other Lisbon processes has ‘to offer Member States more than they 
could obtain from informal contacts with their partners or meetings at the 
OECD’. In a sense, the problem is that the more the process is a soft one of 
mutual learning from difference, the more it may produce no joint 
conclusions that are of use to anyone. A satirist would certainly have fun with 
this passage on research excellence in the CREST report mentioned above 
(2009, p.14): ‘There is no concrete, agreed upon or limited definition of 
excellence … The diversity of understandings concerning excellence in 
research across member countries should be supported. However, a number 
of core aspects relating to the concept frequently emerged among member 
Richard Bronk & Wade Jacoby 
33   
 
countries and the WG has indicated the need to provide some basic 
guidelines in order to come to a clearer understanding of the notion of 
excellence which can be applied in most contexts. This common 
understanding does not imply that a single definition for excellence should be 
agreed upon, but rather, that the differences should be respected while, at the 
same time, an effort made to identify similar aspects.’ Such verbal contortions 
indicate the fundamental tension in the whole notion of benchmarking in 
conditions of diversity: how to avoid the Scylla of the lowest common 
denominator or of motherhood and apple pie and the Charybdis of 
undigested plurality and diversity. 
The jury is out on how effective OMCs and other decentralised and inclusive 
decision-making structures will prove to be. Suffice it to say, that the more 
seriously epistemic and ontological uncertainty is taken, the more valuable 
will be considered ‘epistemic communities’ (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2010, p.2) like 
the CREST group that foster an interchange of ideas and perspectives 
amongst those from very different backgrounds – communities that can help 
ensure that their members are not locked into monoculture mind-sets that 
make them blind to unfamiliar challenges. 
 
4. Conclusion  
This paper has taken as its starting point the central importance of uncertainty 
in some areas of policy making within the EU.  It has argued that this makes 
convergence on one ‘best’ regulatory, policy or theoretical approach more 
dangerous than conventional analysis suggests. Analytical and regulatory 
monocultures may be prone to disastrous blindness to emerging problems if 
hit by unforeseen disasters. Moreover, in any policy area characterised by 
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innovation and uncertainty, there are greater benefits from policy 
diversification across the Union than the standard analysis of the benefits of 
coordination around common policies would suggest. These arguments taken 
together imply a shift in the optimal balance between the principle of 
harmonisation and that of the mutual recognition of difference, and a shift 
away from centralised supra-nationalism towards the involvement of a 
plurality of actors and perspectives in EU decision-making.  
In empirical terms, we have argued that the Single Market has succeeded to a 
significant extent in balancing the need to facilitate cross-border trade with 
sensitivity to national differences and the survival of a pluralistic regulatory 
order, not least through the extensive use of mutual recognition. By contrast, 
neglect of the dangers of monocultures seems at present to be particularly 
pronounced in fiscal policy — where there is a veritable forced march 
towards German-inspired debt breaks and a series of other institutional 
mechanisms to lock in austerity. The neglect is also evident in the proposals 
for a banking union, which also shows signs of a rush to premature 
institutional closure in some areas. It is perhaps to be welcomed rather than 
lamented that a lack of political consensus — not least from Germany itself — 
has generally slowed more ambitious plans for a banking union in recent 
months. 
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